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Giving Local Municipalities the Power
to Affect the National Securities
Market
WHY THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO TAKE
MORTGAGES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO GREATER
REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
The power of eminent domain is one of the oldest and
most controversial sovereign rights1 by which governments can
relieve citizens of their property without their permission.2 While
the most common use of eminent domain is for governmental
seizure of real property—land and buildings3—the power has
been broadly interpreted to reach many other forms of property,
including both the tangible and the intangible.4 Furthermore,
while eminent domain is grounded in the sovereignty of the
individual states, each state has delegated this power to local
governments,5 including some of “the smallest government
entities like townships and school districts.”6 Thus, as the
power is more broadly dispersed and its reach expanded, the
threat to citizens’ property rights is arguably increased.7
1 See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012); see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D
Eminent Domain § 21 (2012) (addressing the possession of “the sovereign power of
eminent domain” by the states).
2 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3, supra note 1.
3 David C. John, San Bernardino County’s Loan Seizures Would Destroy Its
Mortgage Market Just as Housing Starts to Recover, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 13, 2012),
http://report.heritage.org/ib3665 (“Eminent domain is usually used to take property
that is in the way of a proposed road, government building, or similar project . . . .”).
4 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 51 (2012).
5 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 23 (2012). Eminent domain is also grounded
in the sovereignty of the federal government, which in turn has the ability to delegate the
power to its agencies. See 7 FED. PROC., L. ED. Condemnation of Property § 14:1.
6 MICHAEL SAUVANTE, EMINENT DOMAIN: HOW TO USE EMINENT DOMAIN TO
STOP FORECLOSURES, RESCUE HOMEOWNERS AND SAVE COMMUNITIES 2 (Vari MacNeil
ed., 2012).
7 Senate Representative from Idaho, Jim Guthrie, introduced a bill to
increase the number of checks placed on local governments to use the power of eminent
domain to take the property of their constituents, on the basis that the local
governments had been granted too much autonomy over decisions to use the power of
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Citizens are not left entirely unprotected. The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution limits the exercise of
eminent domain to “property acquired . . . for a ‘public use’” for
which “just compensation” is paid.8 Any governmental seizure
that does not meet these requirements is deemed an
unconstitutional taking.9 However, this constitutional provision
has proven to be unreliable in protecting property rights.10 The
Supreme Court has increasingly and unpredictably interpreted
the public use requirement more liberally, granting significant
deference to the government’s determinations of what
constitutes a suitable public use.11
At the same time, the states have maintained a policy of
liberally granting eminent domain authority to local
governments, arguably valuing the reduced responsibility of
overseeing “the appropriation of property in every instance”12
above the increased threat to individual citizens’ property rights
and the lost ability to regulate local policy-making. Because the
power of eminent domain is delegated through legislation, the
states (or federal government) must use legislative means to limit
an otherwise constitutional exercise of the power by authorized
public sub-entities.13 Thus, without legislating otherwise, the
states do not have the authority to overturn local government
decisions to exercise eminent domain.
The collective impact of the use of eminent domain
power to seize more complex categories of properties, and the
nebulousness and narrowed scope of the Supreme Court’s
eminent domain. Jim Guthrie, Eminent Domain is a Threat, IDAHO STATE J. POL. (Apr.
1, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.pocatelloshops.com/new_blogs/politics/?p=7764.
8 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
9 See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6, supra note 8.
10 CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 345 (David Boaz ed.,
7th ed. 2008).
11 Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 261-62 (2012). Each State
Constitution has its own variety of the Fifth Amendment “takings” clause, to which the
exercise of eminent domain by an entity within the state must conform. Some of these
state clauses are slightly more restrictive, but they do not vary significantly enough
from the Fifth Amendment to warrant additional discussion for the purposes of this
note. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 67 (2012); 32 TEX. JUR. 3D Eminent Domain § 125
(2013). Furthermore, federal constitutional law is the law of last resort, which sets the
outtermost boundaries of constitutional law for the American people (and thus the
state governments). Hence, this note will focus on the Federal Constitution “takings”
clause as a common point of reference for takings law applicable to all of the states. See
Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal
Constitution, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2011); infra Part III for further
discussion of the parameters of current takings law under the Fifth Amendment.
12 51 N.Y. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 13 (2013).
13 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 37 (2012).
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interpretations of the Fifth Amendment limitations, should stir
the states to review this value structure.14 A hedge fund
proposal for local governments to use the power of eminent
domain to seize underwater mortgages15 provides a perfect case
study on the dangers posed by local governments’ use of
eminent domain to take complex securities. The proposal,
currently being considered by several counties and cities across
the nation, presents an unprecedented use of eminent domain
to take mortgages without a concomitant taking of the land to
which the mortgage is attached.16
The proposal, donned the “Homeownership Protection
Program,”17 comes years into and in response to an ongoing
“foreclosure crisis” that has forced millions of American
homeowners “underwater” on their mortgages.18 The crux of the
proposal is to force the banking industry to significantly reduce
the principal owed on selected underwater mortgages by
compelling them to part with the mortgages for just compensation
payments that proponents estimate will be even less than the
current market value of the attached homes.19 Under the plan,
participating cities will refinance possessed mortgages to closer
match the homes’ market value, while also securing federal
backing for the loans, thus “leaving the homeowner with a

Guthrie, supra note 7.
Bos. Herald Editorial Staff, Mortgages No Game, BOS. HERALD (July 15,
2012),
http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/editorials/2012/07/mortgages_no_
game; see also MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION
PROGRAM: A SOLUTION TO A CRITICAL PROBLEM 4, available at http://op.bna.com/
der.nsf/r?Open=sfre-8wdqld (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
16 In the past, mortgages have been extinguished by a concomitant taking of
the property to which they are attached, but nonetheless satisfied out of the just
compensation award for the property. As a result, some authorities have referred to
this process as seizure of the mortgage by eminent domain. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D
Eminent Domain § 240 (2013); 154 A.L.R. 1110 (1945). However, under the mortgage
proposal, “the actual property would not be touched[; only] the mortgage itself that was
used to finance its purchase would be seized.” John, supra note 3.
17 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 1. See infra Part I for
a detailed explanation of the proposal.
18 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013). A “borrower is said to be holding an underwater mortgage”
“when [the] mortgage loan is more than the value of the home.” What is an Underwater
Mortgage, GOBANKINGRATES.COM (July 8, 2010), http://www.gobankingrates.com/
mortgage-rates/what-is-an-underwater-mortgage/. For a discussion on the mortgage
crisis and the role underwater and defaulted mortgages play in the crisis, see Robert
Hockett, Breaking the Mortgage Debt Impasse: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery at 4-14 [hereinafter Hockett Memo], available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/EMINENT-legal-brief.pdf (visited Aug. 24, 2012).
19 John, supra note 3 (noting that an underwater property “is worth less than
it was when the mortgage was first made”).
14
15
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mortgage insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and owing less” on their home mortgage.20
The mortgage industry has predictably pushed back on
the proposal since San Bernardino County and two of its cities,
Ontario and Fontana, showed signs of interest in 2012.21 The
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)22 openly expressed its
“significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to revise
existing financial contracts,” and the negative response it could
and already had invoked from the lending community.23 Both
the FHFA and the private banking and investment industry,
asserting strong positions against the constitutionality of the
proposal,24 threatened legal and institutional action if the
proposal were to move forward.25 These threats have been
20 John, supra note 3. Proponents argue that this procedure will likely secure
the purported goal as “those who owe more than the[ir] house is worth are more liable
to end up in foreclosure.” Id. Furthermore, “by reducing foreclosures, they hope to
stabilize neighborhoods, since a foreclosure is likely to result in reducing the property
values of the homes around it.” Id.
21 Amy Loftsgordon, The Underwater Mortgage Problem: A Solution in
California? San Bernardino County, Ontario, and Fontana Have Proposed a Way to Help
Underwater Homeowners, NOLO, LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
the-underwater-mortgage-problem-a-solution-california.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
22 In a notice dated August 9, 2012, the agency stated:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversees the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Banks (Banks).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) are operating in
conservatorships with a core mission of supporting the housing market.
FHFA’s obligations, as conservator, are to preserve and conserve assets of the
Enterprises and to minimize costs to taxpayers. The Enterprises purchase a
large portion of the mortgages originated in the United States and they hold
private label mortgage backed securities containing pools of non-Enterprise
loans. The Banks likewise have important holdings of such securities. In
addition, the Banks accept collateral that consists of mortgages of member
financial firms pledged in exchange for advances of funds.
Notice on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg.
47652 (Aug. 9, 2012) [hereinafter FHFA 2012 Notice], available at www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf.
23 Id.
24 See Jayant W. Tambe et al., They Can’t Do That, Can They? Constitutional
Limitations on the Seizure of Underwater Mortgages, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (June
2012), available at http://www.jonesday.com/they_cant_do_that/; Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger et al., O’Melveny & Myers LLP, to Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association 6 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter O’Melveny Memo], available at
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id =8589939523 (commissioned by the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).
25 See David Dayen, Financial Services Industry Threatens Retaliation at
Municipalities Who Use Eminent Domain to Fix the Housing Crisis, FDL NEWS DESK
(July 20, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/07/20/financial-servicesindustry-threatens-retaliation-at-municipalities-who-use-eminent-domain-to-fix-thehousing-crisis/; Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, California County Began Eminent
Domain talks in Secret, REUTERS (JULY 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
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made good in response to the City of Richmond’s 2013 approval
of the proposal.26 The FHFA has renewed its institutional
threats27 and both the city and Mortgage Resolution Partners
(MRP), the hedge fund that put forward the plan and will be
financing the takings,28 now face lawsuits from key players in
the banking industry.29
The mortgage industry’s response has some merit beyond
institutional preservation. The proposal poses consequences that
reach beyond the generally limited effect of a taking on an
individual property owner.30 The danger of the proposal lies in the
multilayered ownership structure of most mortgages in the
United States. Most American mortgages are securitized.31
Securitized mortgages are those which are “held by trusts” and
organized into mortgage pools in which “thousands of investors”
purchase and hold shares.32 As a result, any individual mortgagetaking under eminent domain would impact a broad cross-section
of investors, many of whom would be located beyond the borders
of any individual municipality.33 Furthermore, the mortgage
banks have come to depend on the purchase of these loans by
securitization trusts to continue extending substantial amounts
of credit.34 In its simplest iteration, the shares of mortgage-backed
2012/07/13/us-sanbernardino-eminentdomain-idUSBRE86C14K20120713; Al Yoon, New
Roadblock for Eminent Domain Bid: Housing Regulator, WSJ BLOG, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
8, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/08/08 /new-roadblock-foreminent-domain-bid-housing-regulator/; see also infra Part III for some of the arguments
and threats made by the banking industry.
26 Alejandro Lazo, U.S. Warns Against Eminent-Domain Mortgage Seizures, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-eminent-domainlawsuit-20130809,0,6390434.story.
27 Id.
28 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 9.
29 Alejandro Lazo, Mortgage Holders Sue Richmond Over Eminent Domain
Plan, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fimo-eminent-domain-20130807,0,5887956.story.
30 See infra Part III addressing some of these consequences.
31 Andreas Fuster & James Vickery, Securitization and the Fixed Rate Mortgage,
594 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT 1 (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr594.pdf (“Even in the wake of the
subprime crisis, most U.S. mortgages are pooled into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) . . . .”).
32 Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Mortgage Aid Expanded, PRESSENTERPRISE (Sept. 6, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imranghori-headlines/20120906-san-bernardino-county-mortgage-aid-expanded.ece.
33 See, e.g., Mark Fogarty, Pension Fund Power to Explode in Mortgage
Market, AM. BANKER (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/
110_11/-137045-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1; see also Mathias Hoffmann &
Thomas Nitschka, Financial Globalization and Securitization in Mortgage Markets, VOX
(June 20, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/macroeconomic-benefits-mortgage-backedsecurities (indicating the international nature of the securitized mortgage market).
34 See generally Letter from Tom Deutsch, Deputy Executive Director, American
Securitization Forum to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 2,
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securities are valued based on the range of quality of the
mortgages pooled together to spread the risk of default.35 As a
result, banks are able to market loans that otherwise would be
considered unmarketable, and are able to “continue to provide
credit to consumers even in downturns, thus effectively providing
consumption risk sharing to private households.”36 Thus, any
threat levied at these trusts is arguably also a threat to both the
local, national, and even international mortgage markets.37
As this note will show, however, despite heated arguments
to the contrary,38 the mortgage proposal is likely constitutional
under current takings law,39 and the constitutional debate over
the proposal has been merely a necessary pretext to underlying
fundamental differences in opinion on the wisdom of using
eminent domain to address the foreclosure crisis. Opponents and
proponents of the proposal have, first and foremost, made policy
arguments that are unsurprisingly aligned with their positions on
its constitutionality.40 Parties have likely nevertheless argued
over the constitutionality of the proposal both out of recognition
that the Fifth Amendment is a legal hurdle the proposal must
pass, and that there will be no other potential recourse for
mortgagees if the proposal is in fact implemented. As mentioned
earlier in this introduction, local control over policy decisions
pertaining to the use of eminent domain has been endemic to the
states’ delegation of this power. But the complex nature of the
mortgage market raises the stakes of such a policy decision

2010) [hereinafter ASF Letter], available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/
uploadedFiles/ASFRegABIICommentLetter8.2.10.pdf.
35 “[B]uyers of mortgage-backed securities can take security in the knowledge
that the value of the bond doesn’t just rest on the creditworthiness of one borrower, but
on the collective creditworthiness of a group of borrowers.” Chris Wilson, What is a
Mortgage-backed Security? The financial Instrument That Destroyed Bear Sterns,
SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2008/03/what _is_a_ mortgagebacked_security.html.
36 Hoffman & Nitschka, supra note 33.
37 Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n to Alfred Pollard, Gen. Counsel Fed.
Housing Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter ABA Letter].
38 See David J. Reiss, Comment on the Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure
Performing Loans, BROOK. L. SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPERS WORKING PAPER SERIES (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144786; see also Hockett Memo, supra note 18.
39 See infra Part II.
40 For example, the vast majority of Cornell Law Professor Robert Hockett’s
lengthy article on the proposal deals exclusively with policy arguments in support of
the proposal. Hockett Memo, supra note 18. Conversely, the most prominent and
detailed statements against the proposal’s constitutionality have been issued by law
firms commissioned by members of the banking and investment industries to
supplement their policy arguments in opposition. See generally Tambe et al., supra
note 24; O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24 (commissioned by the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).
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significantly,41 and lends credence to many of the concerns
voiced by the banking and investment industries.
Through an examination of MRP’s mortgage-seizure
proposal, this note argues that, though likely constitutional
under current law, municipal use of eminent domain to take
complex forms of property, such as mortgage securities, should be
subject to greater regulation. Part I of this note will introduce
MRP and discuss the details of the proposal through a brief
recounting of the controversy surrounding it. Part II will
delineate the constitutional arguments against the MRP proposal
itself and those against mortgage takings by municipal
governments, showing that, at least under current Supreme
Court takings doctrine, mortgage takings and even the MRP
proposal are likely constitutional. Part III will discuss some of the
potential incidental effects such takings could have on the
mortgage securities market, arguing that mortgage takings
require greater governance than current takings law provides.
And finally, Part IV will propose potential governmental action
that could be taken to address this lack of governance issue.
I.

MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS AND THEIR “HOME
OWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM”

MRP, a private California company, was formed in January
2012 with the goal of implementing their “Home Ownership
Protection Program,” a mortgage seizure proposal which the
company claims will “stabilize local housing markets and
economies by keeping as many homeowners with underwater
mortgages in their homes as possible.”42 The company’s plan is
easily summarized: “form[ ] partnerships with local governments”43
to seize underwater mortgages, such that the government can
refinance them into new federally guaranteed loans to be resold to
MRP’s “large, private sector investors.”44 These investors will
provide the necessary funding for the takings as well as pay MRP’s
per mortgage service fee in exchange for securities in pools of the

41 See Yves Smith, The Mortgage Condemnation Plan: Fleecing Municipalities
as Well as Investors (Updated), NAKED CAPITALISM (July 11, 2012, 5:14 AM),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/07/the-mortgage-condemnation-plan-fleecingmunicipalities-as-well-as-investors.html#cf141uF4t4SmrIaT.99 (commenting that there is a
“general tendency of municipalities to be easy prey for clever bankers”).
42 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2013).
43 Id. at 9.
44 Id. at 4.
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restructured FHA-backed loans.45 While the members of the
investment community that stand to lose their property are
understandably less than enthused about the plan’s
implementation, there are details of the plan that have
otherwise raised eyebrows and attracted opposition. A large part
of the controversy surrounding the proposal is the enormous
profit MRP and its investors stand to gain if they are selected by
local governments as partners for the venture.46 MRP will secure
this profit through a combination of the type of loans it proposes
to target—those held in privately securitized trusts that are
underwater but performing (that is, “not in default”)47—and the
low just compensation payments it predicts will be owed for the
mortgages. Though MRP has subsequently reported, in an
attempt to quell the cries of foul play, that the program will be
open to some defaulted loans,48 by all accounts, non-defaulted
loans will still be the greater and earlier targeting priority.49
Moreover, MRP has not budged on its borrower requirement that
only borrowers “with the ability and creditworthiness to make
payments on their restructured loans” will qualify for the
program.50
By limiting its selection to performing loans, MRP is
securing a quality of loan that is more likely to remain
performing, particularly with the decrease in principal that
45

Id.

The Federal Housing Administration, generally known as ‘FHA’, provides
mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-approved lenders throughout the
United States and its territories. FHA insures mortgages on single family
and multifamily homes including manufactured homes and hospitals. It is
the largest insurer of mortgages in the world, insuring over 34 million
properties since its inception in 1934.
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). It is difficult
to imagine how the cities will attain this federal backing for these seized loans in light
of the response from the FHFA, which has included threats to boycott jurisdictions that
implement this plan. Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA Statement on Eminent
Domain (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter FHFA Statement], available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/25419/FHFAStmtEminentDomain080813.pdf.
46 Hudson Sangree, Experts Debate Legality of Plan to Apply Eminent
Domain to Mortgages, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 2012 at A1, available at
http://www.loansafe.org/experts-debate-legality-of-plan-to-apply-eminent-domain-tomortgages (“The fees and profits could add up to tens of millions of dollars in
Sacramento County alone.”).
47 MRP and its investors “preliminarily screen[ ] for loans qualifying for
modification and refinancing” prior to the seizures. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS,
supra note 15, at 9.
48 See Ghori, supra note 32.
49 See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15, at 9.
50 Id. at 4.
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will result from the proposed refinancing. Furthermore, by
requiring the cities to secure FHA backing for the loans,51 the
value of the loans to MRP’s investors and in the mortgage
market will greatly increase. This is because federally backed
loans guarantee shareholders timely dividend payments
irrespective of whether mortgagors make their monthly mortgage
payments.52 In other words, the FHA takes on the risk of
individual mortgage default. In contrast, “[p]rivate label mortgage
securities . . . are the sole obligation of their issuer and are not
guaranteed by any governmental entity.”53 As a result, private
label mortgage-backed securities are more risky, as well as
cheaper for and less valuable to investors than their federally
backed counterparts.54 The potential profit to be made is
exponentially larger if MRP’s prediction of the just compensation
purchase price is correct—“a purchase price [of] between 75-80%
of the homes’ market value.”55 However, even if the municipalities
do not secure this low price, as critics submit they won’t, FHA
backing will secure for MRP investors a significant profit on these
loans. In essence, MRP is facilitating the purchase of more
valuable FHA-backed mortgages at the discounted price of their
private-label alternatives.
MRP and its proponents have defended private-sector
funding, and hence involvement, as necessary to the financing of
the program, and have touted that, to the benefit of the American
public, the initiative will not involve any taxpayer dollars.56
Indeed none have questioned the program’s unaffordability for
targeted cities acting on their own. Expectedly, most of the cities
that have suffered the worst from the mortgage crisis are also
under critical financial constraints.57 Some skeptics, however,
51 See id. at 4 (“[G]overnments will be able to restructure the mortgage loans
acquired th[r]ough eminent domain and refinance severely underwater
homeowners . . . into new loans to be sold to large, private sector investors as FHA
GinnieMae securities.”).
52 FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE SINGLE-FAMILY MBS 1, available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/mbs/pdf/basics-sf-mbs.pdf.
53 BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-THROUGH AND
COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 12 (1997), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf.
54 Indeed, after the mortgage market crashed in 2008, the market for these so
called “private-label mortgages” became and continues to be, as one journalist put it,
“moribund.” Joe Nucera, The End of Fannie and Freddie?, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013).
55 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6.
56 According to MRP, “[n]o taxpayer funds will be used in connection with the
Program.” Id.
57 Riverside, California, is listed as both one of the top 100 cities that
continues to suffer the worst from the financial crisis in 2012, as well as one of the
worst managed cities in the country. Foreclosures: 100 Hardest Hit Neighborhoods,
CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/interactive/real-estate/foreclosure-rate/2013/ (last
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have expressed doubt over whether MRP’s proposal can be
implemented as free of any public tax burden as the company has
promised. For example, Laurie Nelson of Dechert LLP
commented that, “if courts ultimately find that the fair market
values for the mortgage notes are substantially different than
MRP’s valuation, [participating municipalities] may well be
liable for paying the difference to the securitization trusts as
just compensation.”58
The uncertainty, evoked in Ms. Nelson’s statement, as
to whether MRP will pay more than they would like is
predicated on MRP’s proposal that local governments utilize
“quick take” condemnation proceedings to seize the
mortgages.59 “Quick take” proceedings will allow the
government to seize and dispose of mortgages prior to a
determination by the court as to whether the seizure is
permissible.60 Part of the procedure is placing an appraised
value of the seized property in trust with the court.61 Walter
Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers argues that “the proposal
clearly does not contemplate raising and holding in reserve
until all litigation is concluded funds that are sufficient to
compensate the trusts for the full value of the notes . . . .”62
MRP estimates that the courts will discount the mortgage
values for the likelihood of default, telling investors to expect
to pay a value significantly less than that of the underlying
homes.63 However, it is ultimately up to the court to determine
the just compensation award,64 and if the amount awarded is
visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter CNN Foreclosure Map]; Samuel Weigley, Michael B.
Sauter & Alexander E.M. Hess, The Worst Run Cities in America, 24/7 WALL ST.,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/
19/worst-run-cities_n_2506894.html. Meanwhile, San Bernardino City, the central city
of San Bernardino County, is listed as the number one worst managed counties in the
country, and the city of Fontana, one of the two cities to outright join the County of San
Bernardino in considering the MRP Proposal back in 2012, was also listed as one of the
top 100 cities that has been hardest hit by foreclosures. Id.
58 See Laurie Nelson, Dechert LLP, California Authorities Consider Seizing
Mortgages Secured by Residential Properties, CRUNCHED CREDIT (July 24, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/california-authorities-consider-seizing-47365; see also
Elizabeth L. McKeen et al., The Use of Eminent Domain to Write Down Mortgage Notes,
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.omm.com/the-use-of-eminentdomain-to-write-down-mortgage-notes-09-05-2012/.
59 MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 15 at 12; O’Melveny Memo,
supra note 24, at 13 (“The ‘quick take’ procedure . . . exposes the municipalities to
substantial liabilities if MRP’s valuation assumptions are not adopted by courts.”).
60 See 2 AM. LAW. Zoning § 17:15 (5th ed. 2012).
61 Id.
62 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 15.
63 Id. at 6.
64 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 271 (2012).
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more than the escrowed funds, it is unlikely that MRP’s
investors, who would have already procured the mortgages,
would be willing to pay any more for them.65 Thus, Mr.
Dellinger reaches the same conclusion as Ms. Nelson, and
contends that the potential additional payments the
municipalities will have to make, “multiplied by thousands of
loans, easily could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in
liabilities.”66 Still, private-sector funding at least indicates
that the required tax expenditure on the proposal will be
much lower than if the governments were to attempt to fund
these seizures on their own.
The quick take aspect of the proposal is also highly
disquieting to investors. As a result of the quick take procedure,
the mortgages will have already been restructured and likely sold
well before the courts determine what compensation is adequate
to indemnify the target mortgagees.67 Thus, not only do current
investors in these trusts stand to lose what they argue are some of
their “best loans”—performing loans being paid off by
creditworthy homeowners—at a substantial loss through the
takings,68 they will also see their seized investments immediately
resold to another pool of investors.
Nevertheless, a growing number of cities, following in
the wake of the City of Richmond’s approval of MRP’s proposal,
are seriously analyzing the feasibility of such a plan.69 And
65 See O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 2. See infra Part III addressing
“just compensation.”
66 O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 15.
67 Id. (“The option to abandon the taking if the price proves larger than
anticipated does not exist under the MRP proposal because the notes will be extinguished
and replaced with new, smaller notes, before the fair value litigation is resolved.”).
68 Sangree, supra note 46.
69 The City of El Monte is considered to be the next California city most likely to
implement the proposal. Alejandro Lazo, El Monte Considers Eminent Domain Plan for
Underwater Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/money/la-fi-mo-el-monte-eminent-domain-20130805,0,7256185.story.

At least three other California municipalities—La Puente in Los Angeles County,
and Orange Cove and San Joaquin in Fresno County—are also consulting with
Mortgage Resolution Partners. Half a dozen other cities in the state have engaged in
less formal discussions with the firm. North Las Vegas, Nev., has also approved a
plan to move forward with the firm on a similar plan.
Lazo, supra note 26. Furthermore, on September 11, 2013, in the face of litigation
instigated by the banks and threats to stop lending to homeowners in the City, “[t]he
City Council of Richmond, Calif., rejected a challenge to the city’s proposal to seize and
write down troubled mortgages, instead voting 4 to 3 to invite other local governments
to join its radical approach to slowing a wave of foreclosures.” E. Scott Reckard,
Richmond Refuses to Kill Proposal to Seize Underwater Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
11, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-richmondeminent-domain-mortgages-20130911,0,2179786.story.
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though some elements of the plan may change, private-public
partnership, like that proposed by MRP, is unlikely to be one of
them. As MRP contends, the plan simply lies outside the
budget of any municipality.70 The city of Richmond is certainly
dependent on MRP’s funding to make implementation of the
proposal feasible, as has already been made clear by the piling
costs of litigation against the city’s mere approval of the
program, which are all being covered by the private firm.71
Thus, while interested cities may not specifically grant MRP
the opportunity to partner with them, the governments
contemplate a similar arrangement with a consultancy firm of
their choice.72
II.

JUST THE MORTGAGE, NOT PLUS THE MORTGAGE? – AN
UNINTENTIONAL LOOPHOLE IN TAKINGS LAW

The debate over the constitutionality of the MRP proposal
has evoked fervent opinions on both sides of the fence. Debaters
address two main arguments: (1) whether mortgages are
properties that can be seized through eminent domain, and (2)
whether the proposal meets the standards set out in the Fifth
Amendment.73 This section will survey both, drawing the
distinction between those arguments that question the
constitutionality of mortgage takings themselves and those that
pertain to extraneous elements of the MRP proposal. Though
introduced by MRP, the mortgage takings proposal neither
requires interested jurisdictions to choose MRP as the
Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 31.
See Doug Badger, Richmond Seizure Program: Dangerous Idea From a
Dangerous City, A BRIEF CASE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.dougsbriefcase.com/
blog/richmond-seizure-program-dangerous-idea-from-a-dangerous-city/ (“The city will
rely on its banking partner, Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), a private investment
fund, to raise money to buy the loans from bond trusts at the price established by the
city.”); Staff Writer, Richmond Moving Forward With Eminent Domain Plan For
Underwater Mortgages, CBS SAN FRANCISCO & BAY AREA NEWS SERV. (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:23
PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2013/http://www.loansafe.org/experts-debate-legalityof-plan-to-apply-eminent-domain-to-mortgagesdomain-plan-for-underwater-mortgages/
(“MRP executive chairman Steven Gluckstern noted . . . that the firm is covering legal
costs associated with any litigation against the city related to the partnership and said
a joint powers authority would provide further protection.”).
72 Andrew Edwards, Mortgage Resolution Partners Executive Defends Eminent
Domain Proposal, SUN (July 26, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://www.sbsun.com/
ci_21168357#ixzz2ICdfDcQz; Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely
Watched By Other Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012, 4:25 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html.
73 The constitutionality of the proposal has also been contested under the
contracts clause and commerce clause, neither of which have attracted significant attention
nor detailed arguments, and which will not be addressed in this note. For those arguments,
see generally Tambe et al., supra note 24; O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24.
70
71
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consultancy firm with which to work nor ties jurisdictions
implementing the plan to the specific requirements identified
by MRP.74 This distinction is important because, if the MRP
proposal is deemed unconstitutional, but mortgage takings
themselves are not, the potential for future takings of mortgage
securities or other similar properties remains.
A.

Are Mortgages Property Interests That Can Be Seized
through Eminent Domain?

Opponents of the MRP proposal have questioned the
constitutionality of seizing mortgages on the basis of the
unprecedented nature of the proposed takings. Arguably, the
Supreme Court explicitly deemed mortgages a property interest
for the purpose of government taking under the Fifth Amendment
in the 1935 case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.75
In striking down a federal statute that forced mortgagees to
forgive debt above the appraised value of foreclosed farm land,
Justice Brandeis, writing for the court, commented:
[If] the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property
of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of
individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent
domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded
in the public interest may be borne by the public.76

The mortgage proposal relies on this statement for support.77
However, a historical survey of mortgage takings law
evinces that it is undeniably unprecedented to take mortgages
74 The City of Richmond is in fact currently working with MRP on potentially
serving as their consultants for the proposal. However, the City is not using it as a first
point of attack. Instead, it has made offers to purchase the mortgages on approximately
650 homes, with the underlying threat of using eminent domain to seize the loans if the
banks do not agree to the sales. Alejandro Lazo, Richmond Adopts Eminent Domain
Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/30/
business/la-fi-mo-richmond-eminent-domain-20130730. The San Bernardino County
JPA, however, defined its purpose in considering the MRP proposal as broader than
just determining whether to enter into a contractual relationship with MRP, indicating
that the County was interested in the concept of the proposal and not necessarily the
wholesale product MRP was presenting. See Nelson, supra note 58 (quoting Gregory
Devereaux, CEO of San Bernardino County and chairperson of the JPA, explaining
that “the JPA was formed to explore ideas and programs to address the housing crisis
openly and with the community as a whole” (internal quotations omitted), and stating
that “there are currently no proposals or programs before this body”).
75 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935); see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 240,
supra note 16 (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935),
for the proposition that “[a] mortgagee’s lien is a property interest within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.”).
76 Radford, 295 U.S. at 602.
77 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3.
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without also a concomitant taking of the attached real
property.78 In the past, mortgage takings were only effected to
relieve lenders (or mortgagees) in circumstances where the
underlying securities for their mortgages—the mortgaged
properties—had been seized.79 In effect, the takings granted the
mortgagees the right to the portion of the just compensation
payment paid to the prior property owners that was equivalent
to the remaining mortgage debt.80 This was not a perfect form
of relief as mortgagees were not guaranteed full payment of the
debt owed. Mortgagees could not demand further compensation
above that made to individual property owners,81 and
valuations to determine just compensation were not made
based on the value of the mortgages but rather on the market
value of the properties.82 Indeed, for those who argue that the
value of a mortgage incorporates more than the value of the
underlying security, the just compensation valuation for
separate mortgage takings will be different from the valuation
of homes.83 Thus, many argue that the power of eminent
domain has, in fact, never been used to seize mortgages.84
Furthermore, it is indeterminable whether the court
had such a purpose in mind when it made its statement in
Louisville Joint Stock.85 Up to now, a majority of courts has
arguably read the Louisville Joint Stock dicta as, at the very
least, indicating that “a mortgagee’s lien is a property interest
[in the real estate to which it is attached] within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.”86 This is the only reading that
78 See generally 154 A.L.R. 1110, supra note 16 (providing a table of sample cases,
the laws and rules involving the mortgage takings in all federal circuits and state courts).
79 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain, supra note 16, at § 240.
80 Id. (“When the mortgaged property is taken by eminent domain or
damaged to such an extent that the security of the mortgage is impaired, the
mortgagee’s rights against the land follow the award, so the mortgagee may have the
mortgage debt satisfied out of the award in advance of other creditors of the
mortgagor.”).
81 Id.
82 17B CARMODY-WAIT 2D § 108:96 (2012) (“A preexisting mortgage lien on
the appropriated property is extinguished as of the date the condemnor takes title, and,
if the mortgage is then enforceable, there is substituted in its place an equitable lien
against the eminent domain award to the extent of the mortgagee’s claim.”).
83 See O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24.
84 See Andrew Edwards, California’s Lieutenant Governor Steps into Mortgage
Debate, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (July 28, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/
breakingnews/ci_21177556/californias-lieutenant-governor-steps-into-mortgage-debate
(“People on both sides of the issue say using eminent domain to buy mortgage loans is
unprecedented.”); O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 1. See infra Part II for further
discussion on the constitutionality of mortgage takings.
85 29 U.S. at 602.
86 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 240, supra note 16.
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explains the majority’s subsequent reasoning that a mortgagee
should “have the mortgage debt satisfied out of the [just
compensation] award [for the seized home] in advance of other
creditors of the mortgagor.”87 The majority view does not
encompass a separate valuation of the mortgage but, rather,
only provides relief for the mortgagee up to the determined just
compensation payment for the home that has been subject to
condemnation or governmental foreclosure.
Yet, there is some indication that a minority of
jurisdictions has made the distinction between the mortgage
and the property securing it, viewing them as separate
interests in the context of Fifth Amendment takings law. As
American Jurisprudence summarizes:
In states following the lien theory of mortgages and deeds of trust,
under which the mortgagor or trustee has a lien against the property
but not legal title to it, the mortgagee or trustee does not have an
“ownership” interest in the real property taken and, thus, is not
normally constitutionally entitled to compensation.88

The article goes on to note, however, that, while “[o]nly
those with ownership interests are generally entitled to
compensation when the property is condemned,” these
jurisdictions nevertheless provide the mortgagees with relief
under theories of the mortgagee’s “contract right distinct from
title.”89 This treatment, in spite of state doctrine that the
attaching mortgage does not create a contractual property right
to underlying land, seems to indicate that these states recognize
that the mortgage may, on its own, be seized. Thus, in light of
this minority treatment, bolstered by the Supreme Court’s openended statement in Louisville, and the precedential use of
eminent domain to take other intangible forms of property,90
mortgages are likely properties that may be subject to seizure
under eminent domain.
B.

Does a Mortgage Seizure Proposal Meet Fifth
Amendment Standards of Constitutionality?

While the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are
simply stated in its text—“nor shall private property be taken
Id.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Matthew S. Bethards, Condemning a Patent: Taking Intellectual Property
by Eminent Domain, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 84 (2004).
87
88
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for public use, without just compensation”91—Supreme Court
interpretations of the constitutional boundaries of the public
use requirement have grown increasingly less restrictive, and
it is consequently more difficult to prove a breach.92 In
reviewing a purported public use, the Court has employed a
general rule of deference to the government under which the
Court requires little more than proof that the motive behind
the public purpose is legitimate:
Our review of whether a taking is for “public use” is necessarily
deferential: “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, . . . empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”93

The Court has otherwise entrusted the determination of
the kinds of projects that will satisfy the public use
requirement solely to the government, excusing itself from
exercising judgment on the basis of policy.94
Moreover, if mortgages are property interests that can be
reached by eminent domain, the constitutionality of mortgage
takings, and the MRP proposal, under the Fifth Amendment is
determined solely based on whether the seizure was for a public
use.95 The just compensation prong of the Fifth Amendment test
only serves to indicate what will adequately compensate the
property owner for their loss, or, as it is generally otherwise seen,
what will spread the burden of providing a public benefit amongst
the public.96 Thus, while the determination of just compensation
has economic implications for both the prior property owner and
the government, it could only affect the constitutionality of the
takings if the governments exercising eminent domain refused to
pay the mortgagees what the court determined to be fair market
value of the seized mortgage liens.97

U.S. Const. amend. V.
See generally Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006).
93 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 18
(1st Cir. 2010) (citing Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
94 Oswald, supra note 11, at 261-62.
95 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that, while what the courts
determine to be just compensation will be of “great import [to] investors, it is not
relevant for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of the use of eminent domain
in this context”).
96 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2012).
97 The economic implications of the just compensation determinations should
play a role in the local governments’ analyses as to whether to go forward with this
91
92
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The most recent evolution of the public use doctrine is
embodied in the highly provocative Supreme Court ruling in Kelo
v. City of New London,98 in which the Court took “an expansive
[and highly controversial] view of the ‘public [use]’ requirement.”99
In Kelo, “property owners sued the City of New London and
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a nonprofit
development corporation established by the city, to enjoin use of
the eminent domain power in furtherance of a comprehensive
economic development plan.”100 Under the plan, the seized land
would be leased to “various private developers, who would then
develop the parcels in accordance with the plan.”101 This
included the building of “a waterfront hotel and conference
center, marinas, a public walkway along the river, residences, a
Coast Guard museum, space for high technology research and
development office space, additional office and retail space, and
parking.”102 The plan was “projected to create in excess of 1,000
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an
economically distressed city, including its downtown and
waterfront areas.”103
Many saw the Kelo proposal as nothing more than a
transfer of property rights from one set of private citizens to
another. The Kelo property owner petitioners argued that the
development did not constitute a public use under the Fifth
Amendment:
The petitioners contended that a “public benefit” is not equivalent to
a “public use,” asserting, “[I]f nothing more is required to constitute
a public use than listing expected tax revenue and job growth that
might result from private development, then there is scarcely any
private use or business for which the power of eminent domain could
not be used.”104

The court nevertheless ruled in favor of the city.
Kelo has been read to establish that even as broad a
purpose as “economic development” is sufficient to satisfy the

proposal. As a result, the just compensation issue will not be addressed in this section
but in Part III infra, in discussing the potential problems created by the proposal.
98 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
99 See Reiss, supra note 38, at 3 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005)).
100 Cohen, supra note 92, at 516.
101 Id. at 517.
102 Id. at 516-17.
103 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
104 Cohen, supra note 92, at 518 (citing Brief of Petitioners at 10, Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)).
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Fifth Amendment.105 However, this is a narrow reading of the
case’s holding. While the Kelo decision did permit a taking
promulgated on the basis of general economic development for the
surrounding area, the court did not focus on the specific question
of whether “economic development itself constituted a public use
under the Fifth Amendment.”106 The Kelo holding instead
seemed to broaden the scope of the definition of “public use” to
encompass cases where the use of seized property, though
thought to be generally beneficial for the public, was not
necessarily open to all members of the public.107 However, even
prior to Kelo, the Supreme Court had made some capacious
assertions as to what would satisfy the public use requirement
of the Fifth Amendment. Most significantly, the Court had
reinterpreted the phrase “public use” to require nothing more
than a “public purpose.”108
Kelo’s most significant doctrinal addition is its narrowing
of the longstanding restriction placed on takings for private use to
merely prohibiting takings for “strictly,” or only, private use.109
Kelo made it clear that takings that result in the reaping of
private benefits do not per se fail under the public use test.110
Even under Kelo, the government may not simply assert a public
purpose; the court has indicated that it will look to ensure that
the public use is “paramount,” and the bestowment of a private
interest is merely incidental.111 Nevertheless, as was the case in
Kelo, a taking which essentially encompasses a transfer from one
private party to another may still be constitutionally permissible
if there is an “underlying”112 or “justifying public purpose.”113
105 Eric Rutkow, Comment, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARV. ENVT’L. L.
REV. 261, 261 (2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/
vol30_1/rutkow.pdf.
106 Id. at 263 (internal quotations omitted). In Kelo,

the Court held by a vote of 5 to 4 that the Takings Clause allowed
Connecticut and the City of New London to seize a private home and transfer
it to private developers. The purpose of this transfer was to establish a
private research facility whose development might stimulate the depressed
local economy.
Tambe et al., supra note 24.
107 See Cohen, supra note 92, at 518-19.
108 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
109 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27 (2012) (citing Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
110 See Cohen, supra note 92, at 518-19.
111 Rutkow, supra note 105, at 263.
112 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27, supra note 109 (citing Key Properties
Group, LLC v. City of Milford, 995 A.2d 147, 152 (Del. 2010)).
113 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 17
(1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
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Thus, under these rules, the question presented by the
mortgage seizure proposal is whether the government has (1) a
bona fide public purpose that justifies the transfer of the
mortgages from the former private owners to new private
investors, which (2) is not merely an incidental benefit to a
more primary private benefit afforded to the private investors
who will purchase the refinanced mortgages.
Though the proposal has been shelved in San Bernardino
and some of its constituent local governments (ostensibly due to
lack of public support, but also likely in response to industry and
FHFA pressures),114 the San Bernardino County Board of
Supervisors had in fact gone so far as to form a Joint Exercise of
Powers Authority (JPA), including the county and the cities of
Fontana and Ontario,115 “to devise a Homeowners Protection
Plan”116 to address the MRP proposal.117 The participating
constituencies laid out a comprehensive public purpose for the
proposed takings in the Recitals to the Joint Exercise of Powers
Agreement Homeownership Protection Program that they
signed last year:
For the past four years, the communities within the Parties’ jurisdiction
have been adversely affected by an unprecedented economic downturn.
Unemployment has reached record high levels, revenue to local
governments throughout California has dropped to historic lows, and
[there has been] a drop in household income particularly for working
families . . . . Concomitantly, home values in the Parties’ jurisdictions
have plummeted, resulting in “underwater loans” or “negative
equity” . . . and accordingly increasing the likelihood of further
foreclosures, inhibiting the ability to refinance, and dampening
consumer confidence and economic activity.
The Parties wish to enter into a joint powers agreement that will
establish a joint powers authority (“Authority”) to assist in preserving
home ownership and occupancy for homeowners with negative equity
within the Parties’ jurisdictions, avoid the negative impacts of
underwater loans and further foreclosures, and enhance the economic
vitality and the health of their communities (the . . . “Program”). The
114 Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain
Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/24/
business/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain-20130124.
115 See Ghori, supra note 32, at 2.
116 Eminent Domain Resource Center, The County of San Bernardino,
California is Considering a New Plan to Use “Eminent Domain” As a Solution to Help
Underwater Borrowers and Address the Country’s Housing Crisis, SIFMA,
www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/eminent-domain/overview/. For a
copy of the draft agreement, see Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement: Homeownership
Protection Program [hereinafter JPA Agreement], available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/EMINENT-jpa-agreement.pdf (last visited Sept.12, 2103).
117 See Ghori, supra note 32.
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Program may include the Authority’s acquisition of underwater
residential mortgage loans by voluntary purchase or eminent domain
and the restructuring of these loans to allow homeowners to continue to
own and occupy their homes.118

These paragraphs clearly explicate the crisis faced by
the participating areas, the purpose of the proposed mortgage
takings, and how they will address the needs of the public.
Significantly, they do not include any reference to sale of the
loans to private entities, evidencing the bona fide nature of the
purported public purpose.
Furthermore, even if the final proposal involves funding
and sale to private investors, as the Richmond proposal does
and as is allowed under current takings doctrine, the court may
nonetheless find that the purported public purpose is bona fide.
The concern for addressing the mortgage crisis appears to be
paramount to any profit that may be gained as a result of the
program. Like many of the cities in San Bernardino County,
the city of Richmond is similarly ridden with underwater
homes119 and has expressed frustration with the inability to
help residents out of the crisis.120 The plethora of support for
the program from disinterested parties also bolsters the
honesty of the belief that the use of eminent domain in this
circumstance will help to alleviate the foreclosure crisis.121
The potential involvement of MRP and its investors
poses some countervailing challenges to a finding of a bona fide
public purpose. As opponents have pointed out, the fact that
the MRP investors both fund the program and immediately
receive returns as a result of the program appears devious.
Open accusations have been cast against MRP that it “designed
[the program] for the express purpose of creating profits for
JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1.
Alejandro Lazo, supra note 74.
120 One commentator noted that the Chairman of the San Bernardino JPA did
not even seem “married to the eminent domain plan of attack,” but rather “appeared to
be pleading that . . . solutions to the housing mess in San Bernardino County be
presented to the JPA.” Nelson, supra note 58. Similarly, Mayor of Richmond, Gayle
McLaughlin, in relation to the City of Richmond’s approval of the eminent domain
proposal, commented that “Richmond and its residents have been badly harmed by this
housing crisis,” “[t]he banks have been unwilling or unable to fix this situation, [and]
so the city is stepping in to provide a fix.” Carolyn Said, Richmond to Pursue Eminent
Domain on Mortgages, SFGATE (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/
bayarea/article/Richmond-to-pursue-eminent-domain-on-mortgages-4807122.php
(quoting Mayor Gayle McLaughlin of Richmond, Ca.).
121 See, e.g., David Reiss, Eminently Reasonable, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 24, 2012) (“The
financial industry is alarmed by this proposal, claiming that the sky will fall if it is
implemented. But this proposal is constitutional, beneficial and administratively feasible.
Local governments should give it a try as they seek to stabilize their communities.”).
118
119
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[its] investors [and itself], and not primarily for a public
purpose.”122 The problem with this argument is that MRP, as a
private entity, is allowed to have a private motive, which does
not prevent the municipalities from partnering with the
company for the public good.123 Under Kelo, the question
becomes whether the private gain outweighs the public benefit
and, given the Court’s deference to the government in
determining the extent of the public benefit, it is unlikely that
MRP’s economic benefit from the proposal will counter the
weight of the government’s arguments for the substantial
public benefit they believe the proposal will create.
The most constitutionally disadvantageous aspect of the
MRP proposal, however, is the focus on and limitation to nondefaulted underwater mortgages. Despite MRP CEO Steven
Gluckstern’s explanation that “those loans have the best chance of
being refinanced and helping the plan succeed,”124 a more cynical
journalist has proffered that “the attempt to ‘pluck low-hanging
fruit’ at a steep discount might not fly with the courts.”125 In other
words, the proposal’s target of only non-defaulted loans may more
strongly indicate that the true purpose of the plan is to serve
private interests. Cutting against these arguments is MRP’s
indication that it will consider extending its program to include
defaulted mortgages.126 However, it is reported that the City of
Richmond has only made offers on performing loans, as originally
contemplated, a fact that may work significantly to the city’s
detriment in litigation.127
Tambe et al., supra note 24.
MRP is not the body authorized to use nor the body using eminent domain
to effect the takings. Thus, its private aspirations for the proposal are irrelevant,
provided that the cities’ primary purpose is not to satisfy MRP’s private goals, but
rather to benefit the public. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 27 (2012). However, in
the case of Richmond, it is further alleged that the city is to receive a partnership cut of
the MRP profits from the resale of the loans, a fact that plaintiffs Wells Fargo and
Deusche Bank argue point to an unconstitutional private interest of the City itself in
implementing the proposal. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. City of Richmond, 13 CV 3663, 2013 WL 4016499 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 7, 2013).
124 Sangree, supra note 46.
125 Id. (quoting Gideon Kanner, a professor emeritus at Loyola Law School in
Los Angeles who specializes in eminent domain law).
126 Ghori, supra note 32.
127 See David Levine, The Housing Crisis in Richmond, California and the Debate
Over Eminent Domain, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.wsws.org/
en/articles/2013/09/17/cali-s17.html (“MRP has selected 624 residences for the program—
less than 15 percent of the city’s residences with underwater mortgages. Even more telling
are the criteria by which the residences were selected. Over 70 percent of those selected
are current on their payments, and those that are not current have, for the most part,
missed only one or two payments.”).
122
123
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Some opponents have also asserted that the Kelo holding
is limited to its context, arguing that, under Kelo, governments
may only use their eminent domain power to transfer seized
property to private parties in cases in which the taking is part of a
broader, comprehensive plan for economic development.128 Thus,
they argue that the transfers of the property to a private party
such as MRP render the plan unconstitutional because the MRP
proposal seems to contemplate that the takings will encompass
the sum total of the Homeownership Protection Program, as
opposed to being a part of a comprehensive plan.129 But there is no
indication that the Kelo court meant to limit the allowance to
such cases. Furthermore, there is no implication, either from the
Recitals to the JPA, quoted above, or the City of Richmond, that
the mortgage takings will be the summation of the cities’ plans
to address the crisis facing targeted communities.130
Therefore, in comparing the arguments, in light of
current political views on the proposal (particularly in
California) and judicial liberalness in the application of current
takings law, the proposal will likely be found constitutional.
III.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY APPROVAL AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORTGAGE TAKINGS
PROPOSAL

As Part II illustrates, the courts will categorically ignore
all issues of policy in determining the constitutionality of the
mortgage seizure proposal. Thus, though a proposal to use the
power of eminent domain could be held constitutional, it may still
not be advisable as a matter of policy. The heated debate over the
wisdom of implementing a mortgage seizure proposal was well
documented in the months following the public exposure of the
MRP proposal, and of San Bernardino County’s interest in the
plan.131 This debate has continued with the proposal’s resurgence
in the City of Richmond.132 Opponents ardently maintain that the
use of eminent domain to take mortgages “would hurt the very
people [it] is supposed to help,”133 and unnecessarily forces losses
on investors across a national platform.134 Proponents, on the
Tambe et al., supra note 24.
Id.
130 For example, the Recitals to the Joint Powers Agreement specifically states
that “the program may include” mortgage takings. JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1.
131 Goldstein & Ablan, supra note 25.
132 See Lazo, supra note 80.
133 John, supra note 3.
134 Yoon, supra note 25.
128
129
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other hand, argue that the program would benefit “cities,
investors, and borrowers alike.”135 The common feature among
both sets of debaters, however, is the complexity of the
arguments made, illustrating the greater sophistication of both
mortgages as a form of property and the considerations that
should be taken into account in determining whether to move
forward with such a plan. This section aims to highlight some
of the key concerns with respect to the proposal.
The main policy argument in favor of the mortgage
proposal is that it facilitates principal reduction. MRP’s chief legal
consultant, and Cornell Law School professor, Robert Hockett
argues that “[d]ebt must be trimmed back” to right the collapsing
mortgage market.136 Evidently supported by his colleagues at
MRP, who individually have impressive backgrounds in the field
of finance,137 he has also gained the support of leading economists
such as Robert Shiller from Yale University and L. Randall Wray,
a professor of economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City, who have remarked that homeowner “debt reduction is
necessary to reignite the economy,” and “[e]minent domain may
be the only way local governments can try to resolve the crisis.”138
The excitement surrounding this unusual approach to
achieving debt reduction stems from an ongoing frustration with
the challenges faced in achieving principal reduction on
securitized mortgages. Hockett argues that the main obstacle in
the path toward principal reduction is not the reluctance of
primary mortgagees (such as the banks) to consider it, but rather
“the collective action challenges” posed by the nature of the
mortgage-backed securities market.139 Because the securities are
owned by numerous and dispersed investors, it is difficult and
arguably often impossible to get all of the investors to agree to a
course of action that, on the face of it, reduces the value of their
investments.140 Furthermore, without “combined orchestration,”
each investor will wait to see how other investors revalue the

135 Robert Hockett, PREPARED REMARKS FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES PANEL
SERIES, THE HONORABLE MAXINE WATERS (CA-35) PRESENTING THE HOUSING CRISIS
AND POLICY SOLUTIONS: SHOULD EMINENT DOMAIN BE USED TO SAVE UNDERWATER
HOMEOWNERS? 10 (2012), available at http://mortgageresolution.com/sites/default/files/
attachments/testimony_of_robert_hockett_11_september_2012.pdf.
136 Id.
137 For bios of the MRP partners, see Partners, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION
PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/partners (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
138 Goldstein & Ablan, supra note 25.
139 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 15-17.
140 Id. at 28.
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mortgages, thus resulting in inaction by all.141 Correspondingly,
Hockett argues that:
Eminent domain clears title to the loan, to the security interest, and to the
just compensation proceeds of the action. In one consolidated action, the
local government clears up all of these paperwork problems and makes
literally everyone better off—just as it more broadly makes communities,
investors and homeowners all better off by paying fair value for the loans,
reducing principal, and keeping Americans in their homes.142

Though principal reduction, the underlying goal of the
proposal, has long been discussed as one of the main ways in
which the mortgage crisis should be addressed,143 as Professor
Hockett himself points out, it is not a perfect solution; a major
issue with “principal forgiveness is that it leaves the lender or
guarantor with one-sided, continued default risk.”144 That is,
“[i]f the property goes up in value the homeowner benefits, but
if the property goes down in value then the homeowner might
still default, and the lender or guarantor bears the cost.”145
Professor Hockett claims that “[e]minent domain eliminates
this one-sided risk by paying the lender fair value for the
loan.”146 Thus, he argues, eminent domain will also be in the
interest of the mortgagees.
However, while eminent domain indeed removes defaultrisk from the hands of the original mortgagees, it only does so by
placing the risk in the hands of new mortgagees—at first, the
hands of the state and, in the case of the MRP proposal, the hands
of a new set of private investors—on nonnegotiable terms that the
original mortgagees may not consider favorable. In other words,
the use of eminent domain strips mortgagees of a right that
ordinary principal reduction does not—the right to choose which
mortgages to assume this risk on, which mortgages to sell, and the
value at which the mortgages should be sold. This in turn produces
incidental negative consequences that will be discussed below.

141 Id. at 17. Professor Hockett also discusses other perverse results of the
second lien market—created by homeowners that take out additional mortgages on
their home—that have proven disadvantageous to the process of principal reduction.
Id. at 20-24.
142 Hockett, supra note 135, at 10.
143 Hudson Sangree, Lenders Less Leery of Reducing Homeowners’ Principal,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 13, 2012, at 1A, available at http://www.tmsspecialtyproducts.com/
article/Lenders-less-leery-of-reducing/201205170803MCT_____NEWSSERV_BC-REALPRINCIPAL-SA_446.
144 Hockett, supra note 135, at 9.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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The right to choose is a central tenet of the industry
pushback on the mortgage seizure proposal. Professor Hockett’s
reasoning that eminent domain will “be in the interest of the
mortgagees” is only sufficient if (1) the loans seized are likely to
default, and (2) what a court determines to be fair value (or just
compensation) for the loans align with or even surpass the value
to the investors of holding the loan. The former point is
undermined by the specific loans the MRP program is currently
targeting—underwater loans that are least likely to be defaulted.
As Walter Dellinger, of O’Melveny and Myers, argued, “there is no
basis for assuming [a performing] loan will default . . . . Indeed,
the data show that a clear majority of loans that have been
performing for years will not default.”147 In fact, 2012 data
indicated that “[t]he majority of underwater homeowners
continue to make regular payments on their mortgage, with only
10.1 percent of the 31.4 percent nationwide being delinquent.”148
Additionally, how close the court’s valuation will be to
an acceptable just compensation payment in the eyes of the
mortgagees is contingent on the means the court employs to
value the mortgages. It is uncertain whether the courts will look
more to (1) the underlying security—the home—or (2) to other
factors—such as the performance of or the interest rate on the
loan—in determining the value of the mortgages.149 It is also
unclear whether the court will (1) consider the value of the
individual mortgage or (2) the value of the loss to the mortgage
pool from which the mortgage was taken to determine its value.150
The latter in both sets of options would likely closer approximate
the mortgagees’ valuation of the mortgage, and the former, the
just compensation MRP hopes the courts will award.
But why should we care about investors’ satisfaction
coming out of these transactions, particularly if the terms of
the takings in fact turn out to be more favorable to them than
expected, and furthermore, if the result is to lift communities
out of severe financial distress? Opponents contend that we
care because of the long-term effects on the market of
O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6-7.
Stan Humphries, Despite Home Value Gains, Underwater Homeowners Owe
$1.2 Trillion More Than Homes’ Worth, ZILLOW REAL ESTATE RESEARCH (May 24, 2012),
http://www.zillow.com/blog/research/2012/05/24/despite-home-value-gains-underwaterhomeowners-owe-1-2-trillion-more-than-homes-worth/.
149 “The value of a mortgage to the lender or owner of the loan depends largely
on its performance (i.e., payment history) and interest rates, rather than on the appraised
value of the real property being mortgaged.” O’Melveny Memo, supra note 24, at 6.
150 Andrew M. Grossman, San Bernardino Mortgage Seizure Plan Raises
Serious Constitutional Concerns, HERITAGE FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF, (July 16, 2012).
147
148
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introducing the threat of the use of eminent domain. For
example, David Sterns, President of the Mortgage Banker’s
Association, among others, argues that implementation of the
proposal will signal to current and future investors that their
investments are under threat of seizure by eminent domain.151
This threat is predicated on a perceived unpredictability as to
when the power of eminent domain will be exercised.152 This
concern is not entirely unfounded; the plan does not conceive a
time frame during which these takings will occur. While one
could make assumptions that the power will only be exercised
for the duration of the crisis, that is an ambiguous time block
and supposes that investors will trust the government to use
the power only during this isolated crisis and not every time
the housing market takes a dip.
The perceived risk is inflated by the potential that, if
investors’ performing mortgages are seized, investors may not
receive the value of the loans to them. Because underwater
mortgages may not default, mortgagees also likely attach a
subjective value to the risk of holding onto these loans—based
on weighing the risk of default against the potential that these
underwater mortgages will be paid off, and that they will realize
the full face value of the lien.153 However, in determining just
compensation, the court does not incorporate the subjective
valuation of the mortgagees, but rather the objective current fair
market value of the asset, “what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking.”154
Of course, the obvious pushback is that, realistically,
crises of this nature are highly infrequent, though, given the
courts’ deference to agency determination of public use, it is
imaginable that there is some room for abuse of discretion in
determining what constitutes a sufficient downturn in the
market to warrant the use of eminent domain.155 Furthermore,
151 Letter from David H. Stevens, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Mortgage
Bankers Assoc. to Alfred Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Federal Housing & Fin. Agency (Sept.
7, 2012) [hereinafter MBA Letter], available at http://www.mba.org/files/
MBAEDLettertoFHFA.pdf.
152 John, supra note 3 (“By adding a new level of uncertainty about whether
the mortgages will be repaid according to the original contract, future investors would
see all mortgage-backed securities as riskier than before.”).
153 See Nelson, supra note 58.
154 Grossman, supra note 150 (citing U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or
Less, Situated in Monroe and Pike, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)).
155 Kevin McCoy, 2008 Financial Crisis: Could It Happen Again?, USA TODAY
(Sept. 9. 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/
08/legacy-2008-financial-crisis-lehman/2723733/ (While predicting that a crisis as
major as the 2008 implosion was “far less likely, [David] Hirschmann[,] president and

2014]

REGULATING EMINENT DOMAIN FOR MORTGAGES

887

investors’ memories tend to be short, rendering the likely longterm impact of the occasional use of eminent domain to be
small if not negligible.156
Nevertheless, in the securities market, on which so
much of the housing market has come to depend,157 how the
investors “feel” about their prospects of realizing a return on
investments plays an exceptionally large role in the survival of
the current mortgage system. The added risk of not only having
their investments seized, but having to surrender those
investments at an exceptional loss, may prove either (1) too large
for investors, or (2) too expensive for prospective mortgagees to
bear. As one opponent argued:
The fundamental flaw underlying the . . . proposal is the mistaken
assumption that violating the property rights of unpopular parties—
those holding mortgage-backed securities—can somehow strengthen the
real estate market without causing massive collateral damage. But the
reality is that weakening property rights ultimately increases
uncertainty, undermines markets, and often fails to accomplish the
government’s goals.158

This response is a bit of an overstatement, but it points to some
realistic potential market reactions, particularly if the use of
eminent domain becomes a frequent or expected occurrence in
certain communities.
Many, from the FHFA to a large number of the most
experienced institutional financial players, have expounded on
some of the ways in which this risk may undermine the market
and hurt homeowners.159 According to the Mortgage Bankers
Association, “[i]n essence, the Government entity is writing itself
a ‘call option’ on the mortgage, which they can then exercise
when home values decline to their lowest points, seizing the
mortgage and locking the lender and servicer into an assured
loss.”160 As the Association noted, to date, this risk has not been
included in the pricing of mortgages, but in areas where the
power to seize mortgages is realized, and worse so utilized,
“those who invest in mortgages [may either] refuse to buy loans
originated in these communities” (and lenders would resultantly
CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness
warn[s], ‘That doesn’t mean there won’t be failures.’”).
156 See, e.g., Short Memories, Deep Pockets: Investors Desperate for High Yields
Are Piling into High-Risk Bonds. Here we go again, ECONOMIST (June 10, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/1840188.
157 See generally ASF Letter, supra note 34.
158 Grossman, supra note 150.
159 E.g., ABA Letter, supra note 37.
160 MBA Letter, supra note 151.
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refuse to lend for home purchases in these areas),161 or “demand
that the underlying mortgages be written with even tighter
credit standards and higher down payments.”162
Thus, as has been argued, the use of eminent domain in
this context may “have a chilling effect on the extension of credit
to . . . [prospective] homeowners and on investors.”163 As one
commentator pointed out, “[t]he 43.4 percent of San Bernardino
County homeowners whose mortgages are underwater would
find that they had fewer opportunities to sell their homes as
mortgage lenders flee their communities.”164 It is also suggested
that “restricting the flow of credit to homebuyers” would in fact
have the consequential effect of “suppress[ing] housing
values,”165 the very issue that created the foreclosure crisis to
begin with.166 Furthermore, from a social policy perspective, it is
the poorer that would be most likely affected. “Potential
homebuyers with lower credit ratings or lower incomes would
find either that they cannot obtain a mortgage or that it would
cost them more than it would have otherwise.”167
In response to these threats to investors and, it is argued,
homeowners, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association168 “proposed prohibiting loans originated in areas
using eminent domain from a key part of the five trillion dollar
mortgage-backed securities market that is a backbone for U.S.
housing finance.”169 The FHFA has specifically reasserted these
threats in response to the Richmond proposal,170 while California
Id.
John, supra note 3.
163 FHFA 2012 Notice, supra note 22.
164 John, supra note 3.
165 MBA Letter, supra note 151.
166 Kristopher Gerardi et al., Decomposing the Foreclosure Crisis: House Price
Depreciation versus Bad Underwriting (Abstract), FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
WORKING PAPER (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
wp0925.pdf (“We . . . conclude that the foreclosure crisis was primarily driven by the
severe decline in housing prices that began in the latter part of 2005 . . . .”).
167 John, supra note 3.
168 As the organization describes itself on its website, “SIFMA brings together
the shared interests of hundreds of securities firms, banks and asset managers. These
companies are engaged in communities across the country to raise capital for businesses,
promote job creation and lead economic growth.” About, SIFMA.ORG, http://www.sifma.org/
about/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
169 Yoon, supra note 25.
170 See FHFA Statement, supra note 45 (“In response to an eminent domain
action to restructure mortgage loans, FHFA may take any of the following steps:
initiate legal challenges to any local or state action that sanctions the use of eminent
domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts that affect FHFA’s regulated entities;
act by order or by regulation to direct the regulated entities to limit, restrict or cease
business activities within the jurisdiction of any state or local authority employing
eminent domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts; or take such other actions as
161
162
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Congressional Representative John Campbell has introduced a bill
that “would prohibit Fannie, Freddie, FHA and the Department of
Veterans Affairs from insuring or guaranteeing newly originated
single-family loans in counties that use eminent domain.”171
But how is the inclusion of the additional risk of potential
seizure by eminent domain any different from some of the other
threats real estate and mortgage-backed securities investors have
stomached, without any appreciable freezing on the market?
Cramdown, under the Bankruptcy Code, and foreclosure, for
example, are like eminent domain in the sense that the lenders
will only get paid the fair market value of the seized properties, or
even less under foreclosure.172 One difference, however, is that the
value of a mortgage is arguably not the same as that of the
underlying property.173 Valuations for mortgage-backed securities,
which are in turn based on valuations of the underlying
mortgages, are very complicated, and include many factors
extraneous to the market value of the property securing the
mortgage.174 Thus, seizures of mortgages, even as opposed to
seizures of the underlying property, generally present greater
issues of valuation. Another dissimilarity is that both bankruptcy
and foreclosure are by nature limited to circumstances in which the
mortgagor was likely already unable to pay anyway, and certainly
in the case of foreclosure, would already be in default. As the MRP
proposal indicates, particularly if it passes muster in the courts,
eminent domain may be used to seize performing loans owed by
credit-worthy mortgagors. Whether these differences will have any
substantial effect on investors’ perception of this risk is unknown.
Even discounting the speculative views on future
investor responses to the proposal, however, it is widely agreed
may be appropriate to respond to market uncertainty or increased costs created by any
movement to put in place such programs.”).
171 David H. Stevens, Industry Is Lining Up To Block Eminent Domain Laws,
ARIZONA MORTGAGE LENDERS ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.azmortgagelenders.com/
industry-is-lining-up-to-block-eminent-domain-laws/.
172 “A mortgage cramdown allows you to reduce the principal balance of your
mortgage to the value of your real estate. It may also allow you to reduce your
mortgage interest rate.” Baran Bulkat, Mortgage Cramdowns in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy, NOLO (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Unless it is the homeowners’ primary
residence, mortgages are subject to cramdown under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. “Pricing
for a foreclosed home is [also] typically set at market value in an effort to move the
property quickly,” but can be negotiated down. HOW TO BUY A FORECLOSED HOME,
BANK OF AMERICA REAL ESTATE CENTER, http://foreclosures.bankofamerica.com/
how_to_buy_a_ foreclosed_ home (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
173 This is briefly discussed in Part II, infra.
174 See INTRODUCTION TO ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/12/introductionasset-backed-securities.asp, for a brief discussion of the valuation of these types of securities.
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that any attempt to implement the proposal will result in
“costly and lengthy litigation”175 “that could drag on for years,
substantially undermining any benefit the [local government]
may hope to achieve.”176 In response to Richmond’s approval of
the program, litigation has already begun,177 and attorneys
“have assured the [mortgage] industry that this unprecedented
use of eminent domain raises multiple questions under the U.S.
Constitution and state laws[, a]nd they could contest any
seizure and keep the matter bottled up in the courts.”178
Andrew Grossman of the Heritage Foundation has stated that
“[local] officials would be reckless to discount these concerns.”179
Indeed, the nation is watching to see how the Richmond
litigation pans out.180
Furthermore, and perhaps most significant to the
purpose of this note, the dispersed nature of the property rights
in mortgages means that the proposal will have a national or
even international impact,181 and some investors are not the
sort of large institutional investors who have been the face of
the opposition in this debate. For example, some of the largest
investors in mortgage-backed securities are pension funds.182
Thus, the elderly and a broad range within the middle and
working class public could also be negatively affected by this
proposal.183 Even with diversified portfolios, if the use of
eminent domain by one city triggers the use of eminent domain
by many more, the impact could be of some significance.

Ghori, supra note 32.
Grossman, supra note 150.
177 Lazo, supra note 29.
178 Stevens, supra note 171.
179 Grossman, supra note 150.
180 Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES (July
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/in-a-shift-eminent-domain-saveshomes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Richmond is about to become the first city in the
nation to try eminent domain as a way to stop foreclosures. The results will be closely
watched by both Wall Street banks . . . and a host of cities across the country that are
considering emulating Richmond.”).
181 The FHFA has specifically expressed its concern with whether “critical
issues surrounding the valuation . . . of complex contractual arrangements [referring to
the mortgage-backed securitization trusts targeted by the proposal] that are traded in
national and international markets” should be left to local governments and the courts.
FHFA 2012 Notice, supra note 22.
182 Fogarty, supra note 33; Jacob Gaffney, DLA Piper: Richmond Eminent
Domain Battle Just Beginning, HOUSING WIRE (Aug. 16, 2013, 2:48 PM),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/26249-dla-piper-richmond-eminent-domainbattle-just-beginning.
183 See ABA Letter, supra note 37.
175
176
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Indeed, MRP has a lineup of interested but cautious cities that
are watching the situation in Richmond closely.184
The foregoing illustrates the complexity of some of the
major policy concerns created by the mortgage seizure
proposal, and illuminates the extent of the power that has been
placed in the hands of local governments.
IV.

WITH WHOM SHOULD THE FINAL SAY LIE?: A PROPOSAL
FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION

One of the main problems created by entrusting local
governments with the power to seize securitized mortgages is
that they may not have reason to consider the implications of
such a proposal beyond their jurisdictional borders. Moreover,
even if they do, they may not have the necessary expertise or
resources to make policy determinations which accurately take
these considerations into account; thus, it might be unwise for
states to grant local governments the autonomy to do so.185
However, the issue remains as to how and by whom this power
should be regulated. We can look to three main governmental
units—the judiciary, the federal government, and the individual
state governments—and two main sources of regulation—state
legislation and the Constitution—for this oversight.
A.

The Judiciary and the Limit of Constitutional
Protections

The judiciary enforces constitutional limitations on the
exercise of eminent domain. However, as discussed in Part II,
the judiciary has categorically rejected reviewing or deciding on
any issues of policy in determining the constitutionality of
eminent domain proposals.186 There is wisdom in the court’s
decision not to assess policy. In fact, this rule has come to play
a fundamental role in the court’s view of the constitutionally

184 See Shaila Dewan, More Cities Consider Using Eminent Domain to Halt
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/
more-cities-consider-eminent-domain-to-halt-foreclosures.html?_r=0 (identifying Yonkers,
New York; Newark, New Jersey; Pomona and Ontario, California; and some
unidentified cities in Minnesota and Pennsylvania as cities showing strong interest in
the proposal following in the wake of the approval by the City of Richmond).
185 See generally Guthrie, supra note 7.
186 Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 18
(1st Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011); see also supra Part II.
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mandated separation of powers between it and the political
branches of the government.187
Under the separation of powers doctrine, policy-making
is constitutionally allocated to the exclusive purview of the
legislature,188 largely because it requires expertise which the
court may not have.189 Thus, the Court’s deference to the political
branches in eminent domain proceedings should not be
considered a shirking of the court’s responsibilities. Rather, it
preserves the government’s authority to make the policy
decision inherent in determining what constitutes a public
use.190 For example, determining the public benefit of the
mortgage proposal involves assessing whether or not the
takings would actually address the goal—the stabilization of
the housing market. Arguably, the executive branch, whether
at the state or the federal level, is the more appropriate
authority to make this determination.191
187 The separation of powers doctrine acts to protect the autonomy of each of
the three branches of government to fulfill their constitutionally mandated duties:

A fundamental principle of the American constitutional system is that
governmental powers are divided among three separate and independent
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. The separation of powers
doctrine provides that a department may not exercise powers not so
constitutionally granted which from their essential nature do not fall within
its division of governmental functions unless such powers are properly
incidental to the performance by it of its own appropriate functions. Thus, the
doctrine ensures that the three branches of government are distinct unto
themselves and that they, exclusively, exercise the rights and responsibilities
reserved unto them.
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 237 (2012).
188 Under the separation of powers doctrine:
Article I of the Constitution entrusts the legislative power of the United
States to the Congress, so that democratically elected representatives will
determine national policy. Article II vests the executive power in the
President, in the interest of unified administration by an elected officer.
Article III places the judicial power in judges appointed for life and
removable only for high crimes and misdemeanors, so that cases may be
decided without fear of reprisal.
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 603, 624 n.62 (2001) (quoting David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers
After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 19).
189 See Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M.L. REV. 1, 2425 (2007).
190 “The eminent-domain power requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of
meeting new conditions and improvements and the ever increasing necessities of society.”
26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012) (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005)). Indeed the mortgage crisis, and those aspects of the mortgage market that have
made it difficult to address the issues faced in the crisis, may well be the kind of “new
conditions and improvements” to which the Supreme Court was alluding.
191 See Albert, supra note 189, at 24-25.
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The Court’s deference is also applied nondiscriminatorily across the levels of state or federal authority,
providing no difference in degree of oversight over the policymaking of any authorized governmental body—from a local
township to a large federal agency. As a result, any form of policymonitoring must originate with the legislature, either through
regulation by a state192 or federal193 agency, legislation limiting
the scope of the eminent domain authority delegated to local
governments, or legislation granting the states final review over
the use of eminent domain to effect certain kinds of seizures.194
B.

The Pros and Cons of Agency Oversight: State v. Federal

It is practically implausible that either the state or
federal governments would expend the cost of creating and
running new agencies solely for the purpose of regulating the
use of eminent domain in as narrow a circumstance as the
seizure of securities. However, there are several existing state
and federal agencies that could easily take on this additional
regulatory purpose, due to their already-existing regulatory
functions pertaining to either securities generally or mortgages
specifically. These institutions likely already have the
necessary expertise to assess both the benefits and the dangers
of the proposal, and the responsibility of considering the
implications of the proposal on a broader market—either on the
state or national level.
The FHFA is the federal agency in the best position to
take on such a regulatory role. The agency, which was set up to
address the housing crisis, “has [in fact previously] resisted
192 Once provided for in legislation, state governments could grant the power
of review over the use of eminent domain to a state agency. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent
Domain § 26 (2013). In effect, this grant of review has the effect of legislation
promulgated to limit the exercise of eminent domain by entities to which the state has
granted the power.
193 The U.S. Constitution has been read to generally prohibit the federal
government from interfering with internal state affairs, unless otherwise mandated by
the Constitution. The federal government could likely find the authority to regulate the
use of eminent domain to take securitized mortgages, due to their dispersed ownership
structure, under the commerce clause. The commerce clause permits the federal
government to regulate interstate commerce. 7 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 85:72
(3d ed.) (Dec. 2012).
194 As DLA Piper notes, “[a]bsent a state or federal legislative solution that
says the City’s program is outside the bounds of eminent domain, the legality of the
City’s Seizure Program will be determined in federal court.” Paul Hall, Isabelle Ord &
Charles L. Deem, City Attempting to Seize Underwater Mortgages via Eminent Domain:
Constitutional Objections, Potential Investor Losses, DLA PIPER REAL ESTATE LITIG.
ALERT, Aug. 2013 at 2, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/city-attempts-to-seizeunderwater-mortgages-via-eminent-domain/.

894

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

mass refinancing and warned of the potential risk of doing
so;”195 the agency has described the mortgage seizure program as
“a desperate attempt to try to save a proposal that’s being rejected
by smart policy-makers across the country.”196 However, the
FHFA currently does not have the authority to directly prohibit
the mortgage takings, and must rely on either taking action to
discourage the proposal’s adoption, or on litigating the issue in
the courts.197 The federal government could grant it this
authority due to the inter-state commercial aspect of the
mortgage market.198
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on the
other hand, is much less suitable. Asset-backed securities, such
as those backed by mortgage loans, are “subject to the [SEC]
and its rules and regulations as well [as] federal laws
governing securities . . . .”199 Generally speaking, though, the
SEC regulates the market through procedural and disclosure
requirements for the sale and maintenance of the securities,
meant to protect investors by holding banks accountable for
keeping their investors informed.200 The SEC does not have
experience, for example, valuing or dealing in mortgage-backed
securities. Thus, SEC oversight may not be the most plausible
option to oversee mortgage seizures.
The benefit of dealing with the issue on the federal level
is that national consequences would be given weight in the
analysis of the appropriateness of the proposed mortgage
takings, and implementation of takings rules would be
195 John, supra note 3 (citing David C. John, DeMarco Warns of the Dangers of
Large-Scale Forgiving of Mortgage Debt, HERITAGE FOUND., FOUNDRY (Apr. 15, 2012),
http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/15/demarco-warns-of-the-dangers-of-large-scaleforgiving-of-mortgage-debt.
196 Ghori, supra note 32 (quoting “Chris Katopis, executive director of the
Association of Mortgage Investors, a Washington, D.C.-based lobbying group”).
197 Rick E. Rayl, Eminent Domain and Underwater Mortgages: Federal
Government to Weigh in on Proposal, CAL. EMINENT DOMAIN REPORT, NOSSAMAN LLP
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.californiaeminentdomainreport.com/tags/hr-1433/ (“FHFA’s
concerns [regarding the mortgage seizure proposal] are not new, but it is significant
that FHFA has given them a formal voice. On the other hand, it’s not entirely clear
what FHFA might do about these ‘concerns.’ Unless the plan violates the federal
constitution . . . the plan will be debated and ultimately litigated largely under state
laws. FHFA has no jurisdiction to command states on how they should interpret their own
laws.”); Yves Smith, FHFA Threatens to Kneecap Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn
Mortgages, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/
2012/08/fhfa-threatens-to-kneecap-use-of-eminent-domain-to-condemnmortgages.html#EIjgpFoTvSQX5r4w.99.
198 See supra note 193.
199 See Mortgage Securitization Process, L. OFF. GLENN F. RUSSELL, JR.,
http://foreclosuresinmass.com/mortgage_securitization.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
200 See Asset Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/dodd-frank/assetbackedsecurities.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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consistent across states. The federal government would also
have the opportunity to determine whether the problem could be
best addressed by a national program. For example, there are
currently existing but underutilized federal programs that allow
borrowers to reduce their monthly payments without the negative
externalities that will accompany the mortgage seizure
proposal.201 Under these programs, such as the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP), the federal government
refinances qualifying loans, reducing the rate of interest on the
loan.202 Thus, while these programs do not facilitate reduction of
the face value (or principal) of the loan, they nonetheless “allow[ ]
borrowers who are struggling with their payments to stay in their
home while lowering their monthly payments.”203 Professor
Hockett’s only argument against these programs, and HAMP
specifically, is that they require “significant public expenditure” to
be successful,204 but the MRP proposal threatens the potential for
huge public expenditure as well.205
The most valid argument levied against federal
oversight is that federal bureaucracy often acts as a detriment
to efficient action, and may even end in gridlock.206 Indeed,
several have argued that both the HAMP and HARP
programs have suffered from Congress’s inability to overcome
its ideological divide as to how to best address the foreclosure
crisis.207 Professor Hockett maintains that states are in a
much more suitable position to respond to the foreclosure
201 For a list of the fourteen Federal Government Loan Modification Programs
currently in existence, see Helping Responsible Homeowners Save Money Through Refinancing
Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transportation, & Community Development of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Dr. Anthony B.
Sanders, Professor of Finance, George Mason University School of Management), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_
ID=5826e6e7-1183-4b6c-a8a9-40d6bf792da1.
202 See
Home
Affordable
Refinance
Program,
FREDDIE
MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/homeownership/ educational/harp_faq.html#a5 (last visited Nov.
4, 2013); Home Affordable Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/
singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
203 MBA Letter, supra note 151.
204 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 26.
205 See supra Part II.
206 See generally Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, The Problem of
Bureaucracy, in THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF
BUREAUCRACY 1-11 (1994), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8632.pdf.
207 Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 22; Douglas A. McIntyre, HAMP
Program: A Failure or a Success?, 24/7 WALL ST. (May 18, 2010, 5:06 AM),
http://247wallst.com/2010/05/18/hamp-program-a-failure-or-success/; Reiss, supra note
121 (“The federal government’s responses to the current crisis in the housing markets
have been half-hearted and at cross purposes.”).
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crisis,208 and on this point, he is likely right. The trade-off of
state oversight and regulation is the likely inattention to the
national or even international consequences that may result
from implementing such a proposal. However, it is arguable
that states would be more efficient in promulgating regulation
as the urgency of local issues would likely have greater
political heft.209 Furthermore, the individual states would be
better informed as to the unique affairs of their constituents.
The states could subsume regulation of mortgage takings
into the responsibilities of their own securities regulatory
agencies,210 but this poses similarly high administrative costs as
on the federal level. Arguably the most apt, and certainly the
most direct, way the states may address the issue is by limiting
the scope of the takings power delegated to cities and agencies,211
to prevent them from effectuating the takings of complex
securities either entirely, or without further state approval.212
C.

State Legislative Limitations: Entire Ban v. Requirement
of State Approval

It is unclear which of these two choices a state would or
should make. However, there are some basic considerations the
states should bear in mind should they choose to limit the
eminent domain power they have delegated to local
governments. Both options operate to reduce administrative
costs to different degrees, but the choice of one or the other
arguably depends on the comparative weight the states place on
competing values: (1) the reduced oversight over decisions of
local government afforded by granting them the unrestricted
right to exercise eminent domain, and (2) the ability to regulate
Hockett Memo, supra note 18, at 26.
Id. at 28-29; see also Promoting Local Control and States Rights, CONG. W.
CAUCUS,
http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/promoting-local-control-and-statesrights/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
210 Each state has a securities regulatory office. The list of these agencies for
each state can be found on the website of the North American Securities Administrators
Association. Contact Your Regulator, N. AM. SECS. ADM’RS ASSN., http://www.nasaa.org/aboutus/contact-us/contact-your-regulator/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
211 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain, supra note 5, at § 23 (“In delegating the
power of eminent domain, the state may exercise a certain control . . . .”).
212 For example, in the Joint Powers Agreement creating the Homeownership
Protection Program Joint Powers Authority, referenced several times in this note, the
power of eminent domain granted to the agency is specifically withheld from seizure of
residential homes. See JPA Agreement, supra note 116, at 1, 8. Arguably, the states
could control the use of eminent domain for the purpose of taking mortgages or any
other form of security by simply limiting it all together so that such considerations
would have to be dealt with on the state legislative level.
208
209
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local policy making.213 The former value is, in essence, based on a
concern about costs—the financial cost and the cost in time that
is saved by giving local governments autonomy over the policy
decision of whether or not to use eminent domain.
If the states only value the cost of monitoring, they will
either strip the local governments of the power to use eminent
domain to seize mortgages, or continue to allow them
unrestricted use of the power. A downside to restricting the
power altogether is that the state would nevertheless have to
bear the cost of reviewing and also, if it ever saw fit,
potentially implementing any proposal for the use of eminent
domain to seize mortgages. Thus, the most logical choice
would be the current one—to leave the power mostly
unrestricted and to entrust these policy evaluations in their
entirety to the local governments. Most states, though, will
also likely value their ability to review these decisions,
particularly in light of the mortgage proposal and the
widespread response from the financial industry. As a result,
legislatively retaining the right to review these decisions will
be the most attractive option.
The means of implementation aside, however, direct
state intervention has two powerful advantages to the other
modes of regulation. It avoids the additional administrative
costs of having a regulatory body oversee the process, as well as
circumvents issues of federal intervention in state affairs. Most
importantly, it takes the autonomy of policymaking on complex
and potentially highly impactful proposals out of the hands of
local governments and places it in a body that has greater
resources and purview to assess the wisdom of the proposals.
CONCLUSION
While this note has focused on the potential problems
that may result from the implementation of the mortgage
seizure proposal, it neither supports nor opposes the proposal.
Rather, it is building a case for the level and kind of authority
that should have the final say in approving or disapproving a
proposal to use eminent domain to seize complex securities. This
note principally argues that a proposal to seize mortgages
requires greater supervision from state governments, rather than
the more deferential judgment afforded by judicial oversight
through the application of Fifth Amendment takings law.
213

This value scheme is introduced supra Part I.
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There is, without doubt, enormous value to the goal of
the MRP proposal. Both those who endorse the proposal and
those who criticize it agree that the mortgage crisis is
economically crippling for the areas it has most greatly affected
and that it must be addressed.214 The mortgage seizure
proposal has reasonably been held up as a novel opportunity
for local governments to address the mortgage foreclosure crisis
in the face of relative deference from Congress.215 However, the
reality of the crisis and the opportunity the mortgage seizure
proposal provides do not negate potential negative externalities
created by the exercise of eminent domain to take mortgagebacked securities.216
As Part III discussed, the complex nature of
mortgage-backed securities, and the market of which they
are a part, creates added layers of policy considerations
different from those a municipality would usually encounter
in determining whether to use eminent domain to take land.
Particularly concerning are the far reaching effects mortgage
seizures would have, which is part and parcel of the
national, and potentially international, market of which
most mortgages have become a part. Indeed, as Part III
illustrated, the dispersed ownership structure of securitized
mortgages (of which most American mortgages are a part)
both creates the problem the mortgage seizure proposal is
attempting to address—the prevention of principal
reduction—and adds a layer of complexity that makes the
proposal potentially dangerous to implement. The power to
make decisions of this magnitude should not be liberally
granted to municipal authorities, but rather should be
carefully scrutinized and monitored by a higher-level
authority equipped with the expertise and charged with the
responsibility of taking into account the impact of the
negative externalities of such a program on the securities,
mortgage, and housing markets. This note concludes that the
214 For example, California’s lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom, while not
“explicitly endors[ing] the eminent domain proposal,” told the San Bernardino County
Sun in a telephone interview that, “[t]he economy in our state is not going to rebound
until we address the number one thing holding us back, and that’s these homes that
are underwater[.]” Edwards, supra note 84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215 John W. Schoen, Governments Mull Radical Solution to Underwater Mortgages:
Seize Them, NBC NEWS, available at http://www.certifiedforensicloanauditors.com/
articles/08.12/governments-mull-radical-solution-to-underwater-mortgages.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2013) (quoting Gregory Deveraux, administrator for San Bernardino
County, saying that “[f]ederal programs have not been very successful at all, and the
private programs have been of limited help”).
216 See MBA Letter, supra note 151.
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authorities best equipped to address these concerns are the
states, either through directly limiting the power delegated
or by retaining the power to review.
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